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FREE MOVEMENT OF LIFE? THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE BEST 
INTERESTS TEST AND THE RIGHT TO FREELY RECEIVE SERVICES IN 
TAFIDA RAQEEB 
Forthcoming in Public Law (July 2020) 
Barend van Leeuwen* 
1. Introduction 
Do the parents of a young child in a minimally conscious state have the right to take her to Italy if 
her doctors are proposing to withdraw treatment? After Charlie Gard1 and Alfie Evans,2 Tafida 
Raqeeb’s case3 represents another tragic and difficult example of a fundamental conflict between 
doctors and parents as to whether a child’s medical treatment should be continued. The unique 
feature of Tafida’s case was that, for the first time, a detailed argument based on free movement 
law was presented in support of the claim that her transfer to Italy should be allowed. This free 
movement argument formed the foundation of an application for judicial review, which was dealt 
with separately from the best interests test.  
This article will focus on the free movement law dimensions of the judgment.4 Three arguments 
will be made. First, the distinction between a judicial review claim and the best interests 
undermines the effectiveness of the procedure for determining a child’s best interests. The 
outcome of the best interests test has to be compatible with free movement law. Second, a finding 
that it is in the patient’s best interest to receive treatment in another Member State does not 
automatically mean that their free movement rights have been breached if the hospital refused a 
transfer. Third, it remains unclear to what extent doctors are under an obligation to facilitate 
patients in obtaining a second opinion from doctors based in another Member State.    
2. The factual background and judgment 
Tafida Raqeeb was a happy and healthy 4-year-old child when she suddenly stopped breathing in 
February 2019. It turned out that she had an extensive bleeding in her brain, which caused 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor in EU Law, Durham University. I am grateful to Emma Cave for her comments and help with 
the medical law aspects of the case. 
1 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates and Gard [2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam). 
2 Evans and James v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWCA 984 (Civ). 
3 Tafida Raqeeb (By her Litigation Friend XX) v Barts NHS Foundation Trust [2010] EWHC 2531 (Admin) and Barts NHS 
Foundation Trust v Shalina Begum and Muhhamed Raqeeb [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam). 
4 For a detailed discussion of the medical law aspects of the case, see E. Cave et al., ‘Making decisions for children: 
Accommodating parental choice in best interests determinations’ (2019) 27 Medical Law Review (forthcoming). 
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irreversible damage.5 She has been on artificial ventilation ever since and there is no prospect of 
any significant improvement of her situation. Her doctors in the Royal London Hospital 
recommended that treatment be withdrawn because it was no longer in Tafida’s best interests. 
However, Tafida’s parents, influenced by their Islamic faith, did not want treatment to be 
withdrawn under any circumstances.6 They obtained a second opinion from a hospital in Genoa, 
Italy. The Italian doctors did not believe that treatment should be withdrawn and they were willing 
to continue to provide care to Tafida.7 In July 2019, the Italian hospital accepted a request to 
transfer Tafida to Genoa.8 The doctors in the Royal London Hospital considered that a transfer 
to Italy would not be in her best interests and made an application to the court for a decision on 
Tafida’s best interests. 
In September 2019, the case was heard by MacDonald J. A distinction was made between an 
application for judicial review, heard in the Administrative Court, and the best interests test, heard 
in the Family Court. In the claim for judicial review, Tafida’s parents argued that the hospital had 
breached Tafida’s right under Article 56 TFEU to freely receive medical services in Italy. Their 
primary argument was that the doctors had failed to take Tafida’s free movement rights into 
consideration in reaching a decision on the continuation of her treatment.9 If they had done this, 
they would have concluded that Tafida’s transfer to Italy should be allowed. In the circumstances 
of this case, where a foreign hospital was willing to continue treatment without risk to Tafida, the 
parents submitted that a restriction of Article 56 TFEU could not be justified. The hospital argued 
that this case was not about where Tafida’s treatment took place, but about whether further treatment 
was in Tafida’s best interests.10 Any restriction on free movement was justified to protect Tafida’s 
best interests and to allow the court to reach a decision on this issue.  
In the application under the Children Act 1989 and the court’s inherent jurisdiction, the hospital 
submitted that no benefit would be gained from further treatment. It accepted that Tafida was not 
experiencing pain.11 She was currently in a minimally conscious state, but if she ever were to regain 
more awareness, this could lead her to experience pain. According to the hospital, it was not 
possible for the court to ascertain Tafida’s wishes on whether her treatment should be continued 
and her parents’ religious convictions did not give them the right to access medical treatment that 
was not in Tafida’s best interests. The parents argued that the doctors’ perspective had been too 
                                                          
5 Raqeeb, [8]. 
6 Raqeeb, [12]. 
7 Raqeeb, [13]. 
8 Raqeeb, [13]. 
9 Raqeeb, [49]. 
10 Raqeeb, [58]. 
11 Raqeeb, [64]-[66]. 
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narrow and had focussed exclusively on Tafida’s medical best interests.12 The doctors should have 
taken the broader religious and cultural context in which her family experienced her situation into 
account. At the age of four, Tafida had already developed an understanding of her religion and her 
rights under Article 9 of the ECHR should be protected by granting her the right to be treated in 
Italy.13 The parents argued that the medical position of the Italian doctors was in accordance with 
mainstream medical opinion and was entirely responsible in the circumstances of her case.14 
MacDonald J granted the application for judicial review. His decision was primarily based on the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Blood,15 in which it had held that a public authority was under a duty 
to consider a patient’s free movement rights. The hospital had not directed itself properly as to the 
applicable EU law.16 MacDonald J found that if the hospital had taken Tafida’s Article 56 TFEU 
rights into consideration, it would still have reached the same decision, because the restriction 
could be justified on public policy grounds. He held that the procedure established by the Children 
Act, whereby doctors are required to apply to the court for a declaration on the patient’s best 
interests, was compatible with Article 56 TFEU.17 The judge concluded that, since the hospital 
would have reached the same outcome if it had taken Tafida’s free movement rights into account, 
it was not appropriate to grant relief.18 
In deciding on Tafida’s best interests, MacDonald J was critical of the hospital’s narrow “medical 
best interests” test, which failed to take sufficient account of Tafida’s cultural and religious 
background.19 The sanctity of Tafida’s life was paramount and the Italian hospital was able to 
provide substantially the same treatment as was currently provided in London. This treatment 
would be compatible with Tafida and her parents’ religious views. MacDonald J held that the 
English courts and hospitals do not hold a monopoly on ethical matters.20 Overall, he concluded 
that the withdrawal of treatment was not in Tafida’s best interests.21 The hospital decided not to 
bring an appeal against the judgment. As a result, Tafida could be transferred to Italy. She arrived 
in Genoa on 15th October 2019.22 
3. The distinction between judicial review and the best interests test 
                                                          
12 Raqeeb, [75]. 
13 Raqeeb, [77]. 
14 Raqeeb, [79]. 
15 R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ex parte Blood [1999] Fam 151. 
16 Raqeeb, [144]. 
17 Raqeeb, [151]. 
18 Raqeeb, [155]-[158]. 
19 Raqeeb, [171]. 
20 Raqeeb, [178]. 
21 Raqeeb, [185]. 
22 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-50068246. 
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It is not surprising that this complicated and sensitive case was ultimately decided by the best 
interests test. From the overall perspective of this case, the free movement argument could be seen 
as a “prologue” to the best interests test, where the real balancing of the various medical, religious 
and ethical arguments took place. This impression of free movement law as an introduction to the 
main issues was reinforced by the distinction between a judicial review claim based on Article 56 
TFEU and the best interests test under the Children Act. However, rather than turning the free 
movement argument into a separate judicial review claim, it could have been directly integrated in 
the best interests test.  
The judicial review “frame” is problematic for two reasons. First, the focus on the hospital’s 
decision-making process undermines the rationale for and the effectiveness of the procedure 
established by the Children Act for dealing with conflicts between doctors and parents over the 
medical treatment of a child. Second, the outcome of the best interests test itself has to be 
compatible with free movement law. By focussing on the hospital’s decision-making process, the 
obligation of the court to respect Tafida’s free movement rights under Article 56 TFEU was not 
made sufficiently explicit. This obligation has an important impact on what can be expected from 
hospitals in decision-making processes that involve the free movement rights of patients. Each of 
these criticisms will be now be explored in more detail. 
The free movement argument presented on behalf of Tafida had two components. Tafida’s parents 
did not only criticise the hospital’s refusal to allow Tafida’s transfer to Italy – they also criticised 
the procedure for dealing with conflicts between parents and doctors about the medical treatment 
of a child. They argued that the procedure under the Children Act could not justify a restriction of 
Tafida’s free movement rights when reasonable medical treatment in Italy was available.23 The 
judge correctly rejected this submission. Although the hospital’s decision to refuse to allow 
Tafida’s transfer to Genoa before the court has given its judgment constituted a restriction on free 
movement, this restriction could be justified on the ground of the protection of the rights of the 
child. The whole purpose of the best interests test is to place the judge in the position of final 
arbiter in determining the child’s best interests.24 In these circumstances, it is appropriate and 
necessary for a hospital to refuse to make any final decisions about treatment before the judge has 
ruled on it. As MacDonald J noted, this is confirmed by the fact that Article 8 of the Brussels II 
Regulation grants jurisdiction to the courts of the child’s habitual residence in such cases.25 
                                                          
23 Raqeeb, [52]. 
24 See Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Haastrup [2018] 2 FLR 1028, [69]; An NHS Trust v MB [2006] 
EWHC 507 (Fam). 
25 Raqeeb, [148]-[149]. 
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Nevertheless, the judge granted the application for judicial review. He relied on the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Blood, in which it had held that a failure on the part of public authorities to 
correctly direct themselves as to the applicable (free movement) law rendered their decision 
unlawful. Since the hospital had not taken Article 56 TFEU into account in refusing Tafida’s 
transfer to Genoa, it had acted unlawfully.26  
It is argued that the judge’s conclusion puts at risk the effectiveness of the procedure established 
by the Children Act. If the doctors and parents reach a point where they cannot agree on whether 
or how a child’s treatment should be continued, there is a presumption that the hospital refers the 
case to the court.27 As soon as this procedure is initiated, the decision about the child’s best 
interests – including the weight to be given to their free movement rights – is put in the hands of 
the judge. MacDonald J emphasised that hospitals should apply to the court under the Children Act 
if there is a conflict between doctors and parents as to the treatment.28 If there is a legal expectation 
that such cases will be brought before the court, the purpose of a separate judicial review claim is 
not clear. An application for judicial review could be appropriate where the hospital refused to 
bring – or unreasonably delayed bringing – the case before the court. In those circumstances, the 
judicial review challenge would be directed at the decision of the hospital not to make an application 
for a declaration on the child’s best interests.  
Tafida’s case is fundamentally different from Blood, in which the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority had to take the final decision on whether Mrs Blood should be allowed to 
take her late husband’s sperm to Belgium for fertility treatment. In disputed best interests cases, 
the free movement rights of the child should be taken into account when the judge makes a 
determination on the patient’s best interests. If doctors are required to make detailed assessments 
of the free movement rights of patients, there is a risk that this process would delay cases reaching 
the court in its role as final decision-maker. This delay would not be in the best interests of the 
child. Furthermore, the judge is in a better position to decide what weight should be given to free 
movement law. The judge is significantly more qualified to assess free movement arguments, which 
require an assessment of the justification and the proportionality of the restriction. Medical doctors 
cannot – and should not be – expected to make this complicated and inherently legal assessment. 
Rather, the free movement assessment should become an integral part of the best interests test 
conducted by the judge.  
                                                          
26 Raqeeb, [144]-[145]. 
27 Raqeeb, [105]-[106]]. 
28 Raqeeb, [107]. 
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The second criticism is that, by separating the judicial review claim from the best interests test, 
insufficient attention was paid to the fact that the outcome of the best interests test itself has to be 
compatible with Tafida’s free movement rights. The court has to comply with Article 56 TFEU in 
reaching its judgment. Therefore, the free movement argument should have been integrated much 
more explicitly in the best interests test. It should have become one of the factors that was taken 
into account in deciding what course of action would be in Tafida’s best interests. An integrated 
approach to the best interests test and free movement law would have recognised the court’s 
responsibility to protect Tafida’s free movement rights. Furthermore, it would have emphasised 
the important link between Tafida’s free movement rights and her best interests. After all, the free 
movement argument was based on – and facilitated by – a difference of opinion between the 
English and Italian doctors. In substance, Tafida’s parents’ free movement argument was directly 
linked to their wish to see Tafida’s treatment continued. As we will see below, the judge returned 
to the free movement argument in his analysis of the best interests test. However, he did so in a 
rather implicit way. Moreover, his approach to the free movement argument was very narrow. The 
role of the free movement argument and the judge’s approach will be discussed in the next section. 
4. The role of free movement law in the best interests test 
The distinction between a judicial review claim and the best interests test created the impression 
that the free movement argument had been fully dealt with when MacDonald J moved on to 
analyse the best interests test. However, Tafida’s free movement rights still played a “hidden” role 
in the best interests test. This was brought to light by the judge’s conclusion, where he started that 
he was satisfied that “the court having determined the dispute regarding best interests in favour of 
the treatment being offered to Tafida in Italy, there can be no justification for further interference 
in Tafida’s EU right to receive services pursuant to Art 56”.29 In other words, the judge held that 
if Tafida’s best interests determined that she should be treated in Italy, the restriction of Article 56 
TFEU could no longer be justified. This direct link between the outcome of the best interests test 
and the outcome of the free movement assessment will be challenged. It will be argued that the 
determination that Tafida should continue to be treated in Italy does not necessarily mean that her 
free movement rights have been breached. Before this is developed in more detail, it is necessary 
to analyse the way in which the judge took the free movement argument into account in the best 
interests test. 
In the determination of Tafida’s best interests, MacDonald J criticised the hospital’s approach 
because the doctors had focussed exclusively on Tafida’s “medical best interests”. This was a 
                                                          
29 Raqeeb, [186]. 
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narrow perspective on her best interests, which ignored the religious and cultural context in which 
she had been raised. This context explained why her parents were so strongly opposed to 
withdrawal of treatment. In essence, the judge was saying that the doctors should have adopted a 
broader perspective on Tafida’s best interests.30 A similar criticism could be made of the judge’s 
narrow approach to the interaction between free movement and medical ethics. MacDonald J held 
that whilst “the opinion of the Italian team that it would be appropriate to maintain Tafida on life-
sustaining treatment is a view reached in the context of the particular legal and ethical framework 
applicable in Italy, this jurisdiction does not hold the monopoly on legal and ethical matters”.31 He 
was right to say that free movement law makes it possible for EU citizens to make their own ethical 
choices. This is facilitated by their right to freely receive – unethical or morally doubtful – services 
in other Member States. However, at the same time, Member States are allowed to adopt and 
defend their own ethical positions.32 In particular, Member States are not usually required to allow 
conduct that they consider to be unethical on their own territory.33 This is precisely what has 
happened in this case, because the London doctors were required to accept the interference by the 
Italian doctors in Tafida’s treatment in England, which ultimately led to a decision that they had 
to change the proposed (withdrawal of) treatment and allow Tafida to be transferred to Italy. From 
the point of view of free movement law, this is a highly radical and controversial outcome. 
The Court of Justice of the EU (“the ECJ”) has consistently adopted a deferential approach to the 
position of Member States on sensitive ethical questions. In Omega, the ECJ held that the public 
authorities in Bonn were allowed under Article 56 TFEU to prohibit a laser-tagging game, which 
had been developed in the UK, from being provided in Germany.34 The justification for this 
restriction was that, for historical reasons, Germany wanted to provide a higher level of protection 
to the concept of human dignity. Similarly, in Sayn-Wittgenstein, Austria was allowed to “ban” noble 
titles on its territory because the Austrian Constitution protected the right to equality in a strict 
way.35 As a result, Ms Sayn-Wittgenstein, who had acquired the title of princess in Germany, was 
not allowed to register this title in Austria. In both cases, although the ECJ found a restriction on 
free movement, this restriction could be justified on the ground of the protection of the national 
                                                          
30 Raqeeb, [168]. This distinction between a “medical best interests” test and a “broader best interests” test is 
controversial. See E. Cave et al., above n 4. 
31 Raqeeb, [178]. 
32 See F. de Witte, ‘Sex, Drugs and EU Law: The Recognition of Moral and Ethical Diversity in EU Law’ (2013) 50 
Common Market Law Review 1545 and B. van Leeuwen, ‘Euthanasia and the Ethics of Free Movement Law: The 
Principle of Recognition in the Internal Market’ (2018) 6 German Law Journal 1417. 
33 F. de Witte, above n 32, 1574-1576. A recently established exception to this is the recognition of same-sex 
marriages: Case C-673/16, Coman and others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrari, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385. 
34 Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin des Bundesstadt Bonn, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:614. 
35 Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806. 
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ethical position. The Member States were given a broad margin of discretion in deciding how high 
or how low that level of protection should be.36 In the context of free movement of patients, in 
Peerbooms, a Dutch health insurer refused to reimburse the costs of medical treatment in Austria 
on the ground that this treatment not “normal” in Dutch medical circles.37 Mr Peerbooms, who 
was in a coma after a road traffic accident, had received (successful) experimental neuro-
stimulation therapy in Innsbruck. This treatment was not evidence-based – there was no medical 
research to prove that it was effective. The ECJ held that the health insurer was allowed to apply 
the criterion of “normal” treatment as long as the concept of normality was based on international 
scientific evidence.38 It could not be exclusively based on national standards.39   
If this case law is applied to Tafida’s case, the conclusion is that London doctors should be allowed 
to adopt and defend their ethical position vis-à-vis patients who are being treated in their hospital. 
Free movement law cannot force doctors in one Member State to change their course of action 
on the basis of medical views in another Member State. Whilst patients should be free to travel 
elsewhere if they prefer the ethical views in another Member State, their own Member State – or, 
in this case, the hospital – cannot be required to actively facilitate this. In Tafida’s case, the position 
of the London doctors was weakened by the fact that they could not conclusively rely on national 
or international standards on withdrawal of treatment of children in a minimally conscious state. 
The guidelines adopted by the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health were too openly 
formulated to provide explicit support to the doctors’ position.40 This lack of support or 
foundation made the ethical position adopted by the doctors more vulnerable. The position was 
not expressed in legislation or in professional standards – it was exclusively based on the judgement 
of the doctors in Tafida’s case. This is an important difference with the ethical positions in Omega 
and Sayn-Wittgenstein, which were embedded in the German and Austrian Constitution.41  
Following Peerbooms, if there were international standards for this type of case, the doctors would 
have to rely on and comply with these standards in free movement cases. However, it is unlikely 
that such standards exist in a field where there are significant ethical differences between Member 
States. The requirement to rely on international scientific evidence could have been particularly 
                                                          
36 F. de Witte, above n 32, 1570. See also J. Zglinski, ‘The Rise of Deference: the Margin of Appreciation and 
Decentralised Judicial Review in EU Free Movement Law’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1341. 
37 Case C-157/99, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep 
Zorgverzekeringen, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404. 
38 Ibid., [94]-[98]. 
39 For a detailed analysis, see B. van Leeuwen, ‘The Doctor, the Patient and EU Law: The Impact of Free 
Movement Law on Quality Standards in the Healthcare Sector’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 638. 
40 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health Guidelines, ‘Making Decision to Limit Treatment in Life-limiting 
and Life-threatening Conditions in Children: a Framework for Practice’, March 2015. 
41 Omega, above n 34, and Sayn-Wittgenstein, above n 35. 
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important for the London doctors in assessing and rebutting the argument of the Italian doctors 
that Tafida could potentially go home with artificial ventilation after tracheostomy.42 Although it 
was explicitly accepted by the hospital – and the judge – that the Italian doctors in Tafida’s case 
could not be compared to the controversial doctors who had intervened in Charlie Gard’s case,43 
the position of the London doctors would have been stronger if they had been able to defend their 
position more robustly by reference to national or international standards. 
Nevertheless, because this is such a sensitive ethical case with a clear difference in views between 
the English and Italian doctors, it is unlikely that the ECJ would have found a breach of Tafida’s 
free movement of rights. This brings me to the point already made above: a finding that the 
continuation of Tafida’s medical treatment in Italy is in her best interests should not automatically 
mean that her free movement rights have been breached. The direct link between the best interests 
test and the free movement assessment is based on a highly individualised perspective on free 
movement rights, which is not consistent with the ECJ’s position in cases with a(n) (medical) 
ethical dimension. As a result, it should be possible for the court to conclude that treatment in 
another Member State is in the patient’s best interests without necessarily finding a breach of their 
free movement rights. This would have two important consequences. First, although Tafida’s 
treatment in Italy will be paid for privately by her parents after a crowdfunding action,44 there is a 
risk that this judgment will put pressure on the NHS to reimburse this kind of treatment in the 
future. Patients have a right to be reimbursed for medical treatment that is covered by the NHS 
where similar or equally effective treatment is not available in the UK.45 It would not be difficult 
to argue that Tafida’s treatment is not available in the UK because the doctors are unwilling to 
continue treating her. It could then be said that since the English court has found that the 
treatment in Italy is in her best interests, the NHS should reimburse Tafida’s continued treatment 
in Italy. This would impose a significant financial burden on the NHS. Second, a finding that the 
patient’s free movement rights are not breached would mean that patients cannot use free 
movement law as a pressure tool to force their doctors to change their course of action or to 
facilitate obtaining a second opinion from another Member State. Irrespective of whether the 
treatment abroad would be publicly or privately funded, if courts were to give a clear message that 
the patient’s free movement rights were not breached in cases like Tafida’s, this would prevent 
                                                          
42 Raqeeb, [26]-[29]. 
43 Raqeeb, [178]. 
44 See https://www.gofundme.com/f/save-tafida. 
45 Peerbooms, above n 37, [103]-[108]. See Article 8 of Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in 
cross-border healthcare.  
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hospitals from having to facilitate a course of action that would go against their own ethical 
judgement. This will be analysed in more detail in the final section. 
5. The implications of the judgment for doctors and hospitals 
It is clear from MacDonald J’s conclusion that counsel for the hospital had explicitly asked the 
court “to provide further guidance as to the proper course of action in cases where the child’s EU 
rights are engaged”.46 The judge emphasised that “each case will fall to be decided on its own facts 
and in such circumstances, detailed guidance is likely to be unhelpful”.47 The only advice he was 
willing to give is that hospitals have to take a patient’s free movement rights into consideration. If 
they do this, “it is highly likely that the decision will constitute a justified derogation from the EU 
rights engaged on public policy grounds”.48 This is not consistent with the judge’s earlier 
conclusions. After all, he had found that the hospital would not have acted differently if it had 
taken Tafida’s Article 56 TFEU rights into account. Still, he concluded that because Tafida’s best 
interests favoured continuation of her treatment in Italy, there was a breach of her free movement 
rights. There is no indication that his conclusion would have been different if the hospital had 
taken Article 56 TFEU into account. 
This shows that it is not sufficient for a hospital to consider the patient’s free movement rights in 
the decision-making process. It raises fundamental questions about what doctors can be required 
to do in cases where patients would like to obtain a second opinion from a hospital in another 
Member State. In Tafida’s case, Tafida’s parents would not have been able to “frame” their case 
in the way they did if the Royal London Hospital had not facilitated the Italian doctors in providing 
their second opinion. This process of facilitation went very far: the Italian doctors were not just 
given access to all medical files – they also examined Tafida through a video link.49 The question 
is how far doctors should have to go in facilitating this kind of second opinion that goes against 
their clinical and ethical judgement, and whether free movement law can now be used by parents 
or family to force treating doctors to engage with doctors in foreign hospitals who are willing to 
provide a second opinion. 
Patients who are treated in the NHS do not have a formal legal right to a second opinion.50 
However, in practice, patients are able to seek a second opinion. A refusal to allow a second 
                                                          
46 Raqeeb, [189]. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Raqeeb, [15]. 
50 See https://www.nhs.uk/common-health-questions/nhs-services-and-treatments/how-do-i-get-a-second-
opinion/. 
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opinion could lead to disciplinary proceedings against doctors – or even a negligence claim. As 
such, for doctors, facilitating a second opinion is usually a defensive exercise. This is different in 
cases with an ethical dimension. In Tafida’s case, there was no suggestion that the doctors were 
acting negligently or in breach of professional standards. The second opinion was based on the 
ethical differences between doctors in different Member States. It is unclear whether Tafida’s 
parents had approached other hospitals in the UK before they reached out to the hospital in 
Genoa.  
The impact of free movement law on second opinions depends on the rights or expectations that 
patients have under national law. Hospitals cannot make a distinction between second opinions 
from a hospital in the same or in another Member State. Does free movement law require that 
doctors facilitate obtaining a second opinion in circumstances where the proposed course of action 
would – in their view – be unethical? The judgment in Raqeeb provides no real guidance on this 
issue. Let us consider the hypothetical example of an elderly English patient with advanced 
dementia who is being treated in a London hospital for a delirium. Her children are able to show 
an advance declaration that states that she does not want any kind of treatment if she is admitted 
to hospital. In those circumstances, she would like to receive euthanasia if this ever becomes lawful 
in the UK in the future. They ask doctors from the Dutch "Euthanasia Expertise Centre" to 
provide an opinion on her case and the Dutch doctors say that she could lawfully receive 
euthanasia in the Netherlands. She could be transferred to the Netherlands without any further 
harm. Would the hospital have to facilitate this? If this case came before the Court of Protection, 
would the same weight be attached to the free movement argument?  
One way of answering these questions would be to distinguish this scenario on the basis that 
euthanasia is unlawful in the UK.51 The doctors would be engaging in unlawful conduct if they 
were to facilitate this kind of second opinion. Similarly, under English law, it would be unlawful 
for the Court of Protection to find that it would be in the patient’s best interests to receive a type 
of medical treatment that is prohibited in the UK. However, from the perspective of free 
movement law, the fact that a particular kind of medical treatment is unlawful in the home Member 
State is irrelevant to the exercise of free movement rights. This is clear from the ECJ’s judgment 
in Grogan,52 in which it held that, in principle, Irish women enjoyed a free movement right to 
receive abortion in the UK. The fact that abortion was (at the time) prohibited in Ireland did not 
make a difference. As a result, it could be argued that free movement law imposes an obligation 
                                                          
51 See B. van Leeuwen, above n 32. 
52 Case C-159/90, Grogan, ECLI:EU:C:1991:378. 
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on judges to ignore the fact that the conduct would be unlawful under national law. At the same 
time, it is likely that the unlawfulness under national law would result in a broader margin of 
discretion in deciding whether the restriction on free movement is proportionate.53 In these 
circumstances, the ethical position – expressed in legislation – would have been adopted by the 
Member State rather than by a hospital or a group of doctors. Therefore, as discussed above, it 
would be easier for the Member State to justify the restriction on free movement.  
Overall, it is clear that there is a need for further guidance in this field.54 This guidance should be 
“two-way traffic”: the relevant medical associations should adopt guidelines on how far doctors 
have to go in facilitating second opinions from other Member States, and the courts have to 
provide clearer guidance on what is required from doctors in cases like Tafida’s. The personal and 
individual nature of the best interests test does not provide an excuse to refuse to engage with 
these broader issues, which are of significant practical relevance to doctors and hospitals.  
6. Conclusion 
A pragmatic way of looking at Raqeeb would be to say that no more free movement arguments can 
be made after Brexit. As a result, the free movement “frame” relied on by Tafida and her parents 
will no longer be available. Such a statement would certainly be correct. While the UK would like 
to keep free movement of goods – at least to a significant extent –, free movement of services is 
not currently on the table for the negotiations on a free trade agreement between the EU and the 
UK.55  
However, to focus solely on free movement law would be too simplistic. After Brexit, there will 
continue to be cases with a conflict of opinion between doctors and parents, with doctors in 
different states expressing different views on the ethics of a certain type of medical treatment. 
Raqeeb has done very little to provide guidance to doctors on how they should act in this kind of 
cases. Therefore, the courts should be encouraged to provide more detailed guidance in future 
best interests cases. In the meantime, doctors should adopt guidelines on the extent to which they 
will facilitate second opinions in cases where the ethical views of the doctors in another state go 
against the ethical views of the English medical profession. 
                                                          
53 See F. de Witte, above n 32, and B. van Leeuwen, above n 32. 
54 See also the reaction of the hospital after the judgment in Raqeeb: https://www.bartshealth.nhs.uk/news/media-
statement-regarding-our-care-of-tafida-raqeeb-6626. 
55 European Commission, ‘Revised text of the Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future 
relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom as agreed at negotiators’ level on 17 October 
2019, to replace the one published in OJ C 66I of 19.2.2019’, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/revised_political_declaration.pdf. 
